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WHENCE COME THESE SINEWS?
JOHN

R.

BROWN*

This subject, WHENCE COME THESE SINEWS?, came to me while
listening to the paper delivered by one of our most brilliant United States
District Judges at the Annual Judicial Conference of all the Judges of the
Fifth Circuit this last May. The general theme of the Conference was
"A Fair Trial and a Free Press" in which many Judges and lawyers, radio,
television and newspaper people discussed this complex subject. Under
the title "The Shrinking Contempt Power of the Trial Judge as Affected
by the First Amendment," this Judge, with his characteristic brilliance and
scholarship, was outspokenly critical, with Mr. Justice Black as one of his
listeners, of decisions of the Supreme Court, including the celebrated Craig
v. Harney,' the effect of which has sharply reduced, if not obliterated, the
power of contempt for asserted interference with the administration of justice by newspaper publication. Now I am not here arguing the matter one
way or the other, although in contrast to the subjects I generally pick on, the
controversy is pretty uncontroversial. The importance of that paper is
that, as I heard him, his basic theme was that the power of contempt was
indispensable because it is the strength of the law. He expressed it this
way:
"The power of contempt is equated with due process of law,
because this power lies at the core of the judicial process. In this
power, and I emphasize the power, not its frequent exercise, of
contempt, is the very sanction, the army, the strength behind any
and every order of the Court, it is of the essence of the authority
that makes a Court a place of law rather than a disordered forum.
Every Trial Judge . . .knows that it is largely this reserve power

that enables him to keep order in court and generally assure
litigants a fair trial of their cases ......
And criticizing Craig v. Harney and others in this light, he further
said:
"Indeed, it seems to me the Supreme Court in this particular is
beset by a psychological quirk in the nature of a collective superiority complex. The Supreme Court seems to feel that our judiciary is so strong and abidingly respected that it may dispense with
its defensive armament. It would be a happy thought that our
courts could do without any strength other than the power of
but recent history
their words and the purity of their motivo ,.,
records that at some times and places

. . .

courts do need this

contempt power in pending cases. ..."
Now in deference to this very, very learned, careful Trial Judge, I
want to indicate my difference, not in the conclusions he was espousing
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about the exercise of the contempt power, but this underlying theme that
the power of the law is finally the power of the bailiff's arm; that the rule
of law rests upon the fear of those governed that if they do not obey, they
will be punished; that the law as a ruling force in our daily lives depends
upon coercive punitive sanctions.
It is not merely to disagree with this Judge, my good and warm friend,
that, as a paradox, makes me indebted to him for what inspiration this
speech may have. It is because, thinking that the power of law comes
from something much more noble, there may be some place for a critical
re-examination by us as Judges, and by lawyers too, on how well Courts
tnd justice are responding t6 these lofty claims.
Is not the real strength of the law, the real power of the Judge, the
vital influence of the Court, due to the innate public respect for law,
Judges, and Courts? And is this not because law as an institution, Judges
and the Courts, are a part of a system of Government willingly assumed
by the people as they undertake to govern themselves. Is it not because
free men, in a free society, freely believe that to remain free, there must be
the means of peaceably resolving controversies, and so believing, anxiously
and indispensably place themselves under the rule of law and those who
administer it?
Would one think that the strength of the Government as such is the
lurking power of the policeman? Are legislative bodies respected merely
because they have, or thought they had, some vague punitive power to
protect the legislative process? Are agents of the Executive, administering
law, respected merely because, in very limited circumstances, there may be
criminal sanctions protecting the person of those agents while in the performance of their duties? Is the citizen in his daily living in this great
country of ours generally conscious that what he does or does not do is
because of the threat of traditional punishment?
I think definitely none of these things is true. And I think, moreover,
that it lowers the Government of which we are a part and reduces the
citizen to a mere subject, rather than a joint and self-ruler, to ascribe to
him any such motivation and put the power of organized Government,
which encompasses the judiciary, on the plane of force.
As we think this thing through, since the judicial system is a necessary
part of Government, is there any reason for supposing that it came into
being or owes its existence or power to forces and motives different than
those which brought about Government as a whole? Intrigued as I have
been as this has turned over in my mind, it has been refreshing to return
to early political philosophers to whom the modern world owes so much.
From them we soon see that we are what we are, that we are the United
States of America because we want to be, that the whole system of Government is one resting upon the willing, enthusiastic act of each citizen making
himself subject to the general will.
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Rousseau in his "Social Contract" put it:
"If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its
essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under
the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate
capacity,2 we receive each member as an indivisible part of the
whole."
And again:
"The undertakings which bind us to the social body are
obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such
that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working
for ourselves ....,,3
Thomas Hobbes, in the Leviathan, stated:
"The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able
to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries
of one another, and thereby . . . live contentedly, is to confer all
their power and strength upon ...one assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: ...This
is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in
one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with
every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man:
I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man,
or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up
thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner ..- 4
And John Locke put it thus:
"Men being, .. . by nature all free, equal, and independent,
no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political
power of another without his own consent, which is done by
agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for
their comfortable, safe and peaceable living. . . .And thus every
man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under
one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of
that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to
be concluded by it;
And, in this day of apprehension of the so-called foreign philosophies,
we need not declare how much or what part of these and similar utterances
we may accept. For Americans translated these things not only into action
but into American words which here bear repeating.
Listen to the climax of the Declaration of Independence:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed; ..
2.

Rousseau, Social Contract, Book 1, Chap. 6.

3.
4.
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And these few words from the Preamble of the Constitution itself
reflect the voluntary submission to the rule of law:
"We, the people of the United States . . . to . . . establish
justice ... and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our

posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America."
Surely the judiciary is not the only part of Government, nor is it the
only branch which finally has a vital impact upon the daily actions and
conduct of the citizens. Government in all of its awesome comprehension
controls and guides, impedes, permits, encourages, forbids, the countless
acts of this multitudinous people. Now the point I am trying to make is
simply this: if the Government itself came into being, and now exists, because of the willing acceptance of it by the citizens as a conscious, moral
agreement to abide the will of the people as long as he is one of those
people enabled to participate in the decisions affecting others; if that is the
origin of our organized Governmental society; if it is this voluntary assent
to be subjected to the rule of one's fellows, then, and here is the real
question, what ground is there for thinking that for a limited part of that
very Government, the judiciary, the strength lay not in the consent of
those subjected to it, but in the naked threat, assertion, or capacity of
forceable restraint or punishment?
We know, of course, that amongst 170,000,000 people in the United
States and some 40,000,000 in England where the aim of a free government
is so parallel, a peaceable existence continues because people want to live
in accordance with the laws which they themselves have enacted. They
obey and respect law because they have agreed to do it, and without their
agreement to abide, it becomes tyrannical power exerted by one who has
no right. In a less abstract sense, we know, for example, that there are
simply not enough policemen in Texas, in Houston, in New York City,
in the United States as a whole to police the action of every citizen every
day. We know as well that most laws, the spirit or the policy of them,
become a part of the accepted life of the community with never the slightest show of punitive coercive sanctions in the usual sense.
It is here that this becomes something more than an academic inquiry
into the engaging philosophies of a free government of a free people. For
while we can conceive of the founders of our country entering into this
compact, we are all born in it, and our freedom of choice is probably that
of the freedom to leave or secure enough persons of like views if we want
a change. So as each new generation absorbs governmental advantages and
assumes governmental responsibilities, it is because it respects government
and all of its branches as the means best suited to assure liberty and freedom. The strength of the community is in the continued acceptance,
almost as though we were continuously making a new compact, of the idea
of a willing consent to live under the reasonable restraints imposed on
ourselves, by ourselves.
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Now, just as this cannot exist, it cannot continue unless there be great

respect for Government. And that means, what is so crucial here, respect
for the judicial process, for Judges, Courts and the administration of justice.
It means that in the final analysis the power of contempt, the so-called
residual power of the Court through punitive coercive orders, is itself
ineffectual unless the people are willing to obey, are willing to accept, and
are willing to be bound. The moment that that prestige is lost, the
instant that the people from one reason or another lose respect for the
rule of law, the machinery by which it is dispensed, the processes through
which it goes, and the product it produces, then free government will fail.
We cannot isolate the judiciary from Government as a whole or from
life itself. We need constantly to be reminded that freedom through the
rule of law does not depend upon the Constitution as such, upon the laws
enacted or upon the judgments and opinions pronounced, that these will
be mere historical documents and will, as will their votaries, the Judges,
fail as living instruments for freedom unless the people believe in them
and believing make such belief a ruling passion of their lives.
This has never been better put than by Justice Jackson in his little
book "The Supreme Court in the American System of Government" where
he points out that we cannot look to the judiciary as the savior:
"... I know of no modern instance in which any judiciary has
saved a whole people from the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty and
free institutions. The Dred Scott decision did not settle the question of the power to end slavery, and I very much doubt that had
Mr. Justice McLean not dissented in that case it would have done
any more to avoid war. No Court can support a reactionary
regime and no Court can innovate or implement a new one. I
doubt that any Court, whatever its powers, could have saved Louis
XVI or Marie Antoinette. None could have stopped its excesses,
and none could have prevented its culmination in the dictatorship
of Napoleon. In Germany a courageous Court refused to convict
those whom the Nazi government sought to make the scapegoats
for the Reichstag fire, clandestinely set by the Nazis themselves
. . . and other Courts decreed both the Nazi and Communist
parties to be illegal under German law. Those judgments fell on
deaf ears and became dead letters because the political forces of the
time were against them.
"It is not idle speculation to inquire which comes first, either
in time or importance, an independent and enlightened judiciary
or a free and tolerant society. While each undoubtedly is a
support for the other, and the two are frequently found together, it
is my belief that the attitude of a society and of its organized
political forces, rather than its legal machinery, is the controlling
force in the character of free institutions."
It has been differently said but with equal vigor in two editorials of
the American Bar Association Journal, one of which says:
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"A recent development in constitutional law which has been borne
in upon all friends of freedom to their disquietude is the fact that
constitutions do not defend and uphold themselves. An essential
for constitutional rights is a staunch people who revere freedom
and whose watch over the ramparts is ceaseless." 5
And what is the significance of all of this? Is it not the simple answer:
the Bench and the Bar must administer justice, must operate the judicial
machinery in a way that inspires, encourages, enhances the willing acceptance of law by the people and increases their vital respect for these institutions.
The shortness of time which is now available spares me from the
temptation of sounding more provocative suggestions on how it is we
Judges should perform to encourage and maintain this respect. In the
brief time left, I can only suggest some areas.
First, we must realize that the public has a genuine interest in what
we do. I am one who believes ,that Courts are the proper subjects for
criticism. My own feeble efforts in opinion writing and adjudication
demonstrate to me too well how the law can only grow and recover from
its mistakes as the light of criticism, sometimes intemperate criticism, plays
upon it. I do not think that criticism should come alone from the Bar,
although it is appropriate there and can and ought to be the most constructive from that quarter since lawyers, professionally familiar with our
problems, can be accurate and fair without losing advocacy. But the people as well are able to offer criticism.
Now when I suggest that Courts should welcome criticism, you Judges
and lawyers here know that I am not advocating popular justice in the
popular sense, that is, a sort of informal straw ballot by which judgment is
determined by popular acclaim, a Roper poll, or the like. But I do believe
fervently that the system of justice and the product of its machinery, justice
dispensed, must be for the day and time in which it is delivered. This is
not to abdicate to the will of the temporary, transitory point of view. Nor
to discard constitutional fundamentals which are for today, for yesterday,
and for tomorrow. But if judgment and decision does not in the eyes of
an informed public opinion reasonably meet the needs of our constantly
changing society, then the people will of necessity lose their enthusiasm
for, perhaps their respect for, this law by adjudication and will necessarily
turn elsewhere. It is the genius of the Anglo-American common law that
it is in a ceaseless process of change and growth, for law is life or it is not
law. Wherever and to whatever extent law does not reasonably keep apace
with the needs and demands of our shifting civilization, we are failing in
an obligation and it should not be too surprising if the consequence is a
loss of acceptance, a lessening of the enthusiastic submission as a matter
of consent and a lowering in prestige and respect.
5.

38 A.B.A.J. 1028 (1952).
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We have, of course, seen these past few years with the terribly complex
problem of segregation a flood of criticism of the United States Supreme
Court. Many think it a unique thing, but anyone who examines the
history of that great tribunal and who will but read Warren's history of the
United States Supreme Court, will see that as the Court inevitably finds
itself in the center of the deepest and most trying controversies, it is itself
the subject of equal contention.
If we can criticize our national supreme tribunal, and I think we can,
although we must lead the people to do it in a way that does not destroy
the institution as an essential part of Government, I think local Courts,
trial and appellate, civil and criminal, state and federal, are likewise the
proper subject of criticism.
This I think is public relations in its proper sense. Courts have no
business in popularizing themselves merely for the sake of popularity. On
the other hand, Courts have a proper function in doing their work in
such a way, and doing work that intrinsically inspires public enthusiastic
acceptance.
A corollary to being the subject of criticism is that Courts must be
able to take criticism. Here, I think we have made great progress. For
until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 which
set in train like movements of procedural reform throughout the states, it
was too much an unfortunate fact that improvement had come from laymen, not lawyers or Judges, indeed, frequently in spite of them. I hope
we have outlived the age in which Courts and Judges too often assume
an almost hostile defensive attitude toward the suggestion for change. We
must stay alive so that never again can it rightly be said of Courts, Judges
and lawyers what Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, whose handiwork will long be remembered in that state, said:
" All of the deficiencies of present day judicial administration
.. . are readily curable-and by remarkable simple means-that
are well known and tested by experience elsewhere. All we need
to do is to overcome our professional apathy and put them into
practice. Professional apathy, I must say from experience, is
merely an euphemism for judicial and professional unwillingness
to learn anything new, however simple it may be. To be blunt,
it is unadulterated selfishness, and gross disregard of the public
welfare, in an area where we are charged with primary responsibility." 6
In this phase of being able to take criticism, as Judges, we should
remember that as public opinion indicates its response to what we do, and
is occasionally moved through its legislative representatives to make
change, we ought to have a decent respect for such change and not, as we
too often do, perpetuate the unsatisfactory status quo by niggardly interpretations of a law meant to change. I am constantly distressed in reading
6.

Nims, The Bar: A Sleeping Giant, 41 A.B.A.J. 908 (1955).
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opinions where legislation is so narrowly interpreted that relief from the
prior unsatisfactory judge-made law, whether procedural or substantive,
is thwarted or denied. This is a form either of a closed-mindedness or an
overbearing egotism or both and, whether consciously identified as such,
is a form also of an unwillingness to accept and act upon criticism made
by authoritative sources.
These, of course, are mere illustrations of how these broad principles
might work as we Judges, dedicated to the common purpose of administering justice and thereby advancing the rule of law, can not only maintain,
but encourage and expand even further, in the public mind and heart,
this willing acceptance of the rule of the Judge as a part of Government.
And so we return to where we began: WHENCE COME THESE
SINEWS? They come from the people. The instrument of law is in the
hands of lawyers and Judges where it rightfully belongs. It is a paradox,
however, that it can have strength only as the people give it strength. Our
strength as Judges, our strength as Courts, our strength of law comes from
those who are to be ruled. Unless they give us strength, we are weak
indeed. Unless we are strong in the stuff which encourages them to give
us strength, they too will lack the power to pass it on to us. If we are to
have strength, we, and the lawyers who are an indispensable part of our
machine, must give strength.
For without it, Chief Justice Hughes makes plain that our freedom is
in peril, that without it we have no sinews:
"Whether that system [of constitutional government] shall continue does not rest with this Court but with the people who have
created that system. As Chief Justice Marshall said, 'The people
made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the
creature of their will, and lives only by their will.' "

